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THE REMAND THAT MADE THE COURT 
EXPAND 
Maxwell L. Stearns* 
(In a large law school lecture hall, Fall1999 term) 
In today's class, we will focus on a Supreme Court decision 
that many of you undoubtedly studied in history or in an under-
graduate course in Constitutional Law. That case is West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937). Parrish is commonly described as 
"the remand that made the Court expand." While the charac-
terization is literally correct, it fails to capture the several ways in 
which that decision fundamentally altered our representative 
democracy. 
The facts are simple. The Parrish Court reviewed a state 
court decision that had distinguished precedents growing out of 
the famous era associated with Lochner v. New York (1905). 
During the Lochner era, the Court struck down a variety of state 
and federal regulations, often including those setting minimum 
wages or maximum hours in the workplace. Lochner itself be-
came well known because in that decision, Justice Peckham 
clearly articulated what he viewed as a fundamental right to 
make contracts and to own property without undue regulatory 
interference. Against this backdrop, Parrish looked sufficiently 
run-of-the-mine that contemporaneous commentators ques-
tioned why the Court had bothered to granted certiorari. For 
example, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) and Morehead 
v. Tipaldo (1936), the Court had reached nearly identical out-
comes. Any differences between those cases and Parrish argua-
bly had less to do with the law or the facts than with the changed 
political climate. 
Before Parrish, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in-
creasingly frustrated with the Supreme Court's resistance to New 
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Deal initiatives, upped the ante. Presenting his 1936 reelection 
as a referendum on the New Deal, FDR began to work through 
Congress his now famous Court-packing plan. Under that plan, 
Congress expanded the Supreme Court's membership by one 
member for each Justice over the age of seventy who was un-
willing to step down. Changing the size of the Supreme Court 
was by no means a new idea, and this was not the first time that 
Court size had been exploited for political purposes. Following 
Thomas Jefferson's election to the presidency, Congress de-
creased the Court's size, preventing him from appointing a suc-
cessor to Justice Cushing. And the Reconstruction Congress re-
peated this strategy with President Andrew Johnson, preventing 
him from appointing successors to Justices Catron and Wayne. 
But not since George Washington, who appointed a newly cre-
ated five-, then six-, member Court, has a single President been 
given as many appointments to the Supreme Court as the Court-
packing plan would give FDR. Because six justices were then 
over the age of seventy, the Court-packing plan quickly trans-
formed the Court from one dominated by a conservative major-
ity of five out of nine into one that contained a liberal superma-
jority of ten out of fifteen. 
Even in the New Deal, many viewed the plan with trepida-
tion. If judicial opposition to New Deal policies warranted an 
expansion from nine to fifteen, would that provide future dissat-
isfied Republican leadership with a precedent for a further ex-
pansion to, say, twenty-three? And of course, this game has no 
end. In the pressures of the Great Depression, however, con-
gressmen were more focused on bread lines than on abstract 
"what ifs?" That is not surprising. After all, two years prior to 
Parrish, on May 27, 1935, the Court had issued FDR what many 
viewed as a fatal blow to the New Deal. On that date, which be-
came known as "Black Monday," the Court struck down the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States (1935) and the mortgage moratoria in the Fra-
zier-Lemke Act in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford 
(1935). The Court also issued Humphrey's Executor v. United 
States (1935), which prevented FDR from removing a commis-
sioner on the independent Federal Trade Commission. 
Even so, it took another two years, with the intervening 
1936 election and the Parrish remand, for the Supreme Court 
Expansion Act of 1937 to gain the needed political support. Two 
more years of the Great Depression had proved insufficient to 
make the Court retreat from its adamant assertion in Schechter 
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Poultry that "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge 
constitutional power." Apparently, this dictum enraged Presi-
dent Roosevelt, who considered it the height of arrogance from 
a group of unelected life-tenured justices whose closest experi-
ence to hunger consisted of skipping lunch to prepare for oral 
argument. 
While constitutional scholars may have placed excessive 
emphasis on Parrish in assessing the present Supreme Court, 
even the most cursory review of the floor debates surrounding 
the Expansion Act makes one thing clear: Parrish was the straw 
that broke bicameral backing for the nine-member Court. This 
is especially interesting in light of Justice Owen Roberts's re-
cently released papers. Roberts had considered siding with the 
Court's liberals and distinguishing Tipaldo on procedural 
grounds. One can only speculate as to why he changed his mind 
and instead sided with the Court's conservatives-James C. 
McReynolds, Pierce Butler, Willis Van Devanter, and George 
Sutherland-or what the effect of a contrary decision might have 
been. 
I would now like to offer a few thoughts on how Parrish has 
affected the Supreme Court. At a minimum, FDR's six ap-
pointments within one year of the Act's passage fundamentally 
altered the Court's political direction. One wonders, however, 
whether with greater patience FDR might have achieved a ma-
jority absent the plan. After the plan went into effect, none of 
the six elder justices was willing to step down until forced to do 
so by failing health. The effect was to reveal extremely sharp di-
visions between the Court's suddenly dominant liberal camp and 
the holdover minority of conservatives. More importantly, some 
liberals who had previously supported Roosevelt's policies, and 
even some new appointees, began to retrench support when it 
came to separation of powers. Yes, the new liberal majority 
would uphold minimum wage and maximum hours laws against 
due process and commerce clause challenges. But having expe-
rienced the effects of politically expedient changes to the Su-
preme Court, a new coalition of conservative-to-moderate jus-
tices prevented further institutional changes motivated by short-
term partisan concerns. This became most notable in the area of 
agency delegation. 
This emerging coalition paid increasing attention to the "in-
telligible principle" test governing congressional delegations an-
nounced in the 1928 decision, J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States. The effect was to limit most New Deal initiatives, espe-
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cially schemes like that struck down in Schechter Poultry, in-
volving policies set by privately managed industrial boards. 
Thus, in Currin v. Wallace (1939) and Yakus v. United States 
(1944), the Court struck down the Federal Tobacco Inspection 
Act and the Emergency Price Control Act, respectively, both on 
nondelegation grounds. The doctrinal effect proved ironic. One 
might have predicted that FDR's legacy would be one of gov-
ernmental growth, but instead, the very institution in which 
Roosevelt forced an expansion viewed governmental expansion 
generally and agency delegation in particular with great skepti-
cism. Because the six new justices were rapidly appointed, all 
within one year of the bill's enactment, FDR was unable to an-
ticipate the emerging split within the suddenly dominant liberal 
camp. Had FDR's appointments been more gradual, his ability 
to ensure the survival of broad-based agency delegations that 
were essential to the New Deal might well have been greater. 
Parrish also affected the Court in another fundamental way. 
With fifteen members, and the risk of an even greater expansion 
if the Court again blocked the political branches, the Court be-
gan to face tremendous problems in providing doctrinal guid-
ance in most complex areas of constitutional and statutory law. 
This was especially true in the area of race. Even with the return 
of African American soldiers who had put their lives on the line 
on behalf of the nation in World War II, American society re-
mained unwilling to cast aside laws premised upon the assump-
tion that African American schoolchildren were unfit to be 
seated next to white schoolchildren. One might have hoped that 
the Supreme Court would rely upon the equal protection clause 
to put an end to this once and for all. The difficulty was that the 
Court had grown too large and fractured to create a united front. 
This was due in part to the increased politicization of the ap-
pointments process. As vacancies have arisen, most often the 
first question asked has been how the appointment would affect 
the Court's political composition. Even two-term Presidents 
have thus been unable to use appointments to control that insti-
tution. In an earlier era, such inquiries tended to lurk in the 
shadows of questions facially directed to issues of competence or 
qualification. But the Court expansion, itself prompted by Roo-
sevelt's desire to alter the conservative makeup of the Hughes 
Court, removed any qualms that Senators might have had about 
ensuring political balance. And it is difficult for a politically 
fractured Court to do much without support from the elected 
branches. In the case of race-based segregation, that support 
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was sadly missing for many, many years. We can, of course, 
never know whether this sad chapter in American history would 
have ended sooner than in the Civil Rights Act of 1973, which a 
bare majority of the Circuit Review Court, rather than the Su-
preme Court, grudgingly applied to end state-mandated segrega-
tion. 
Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the effect of Par-
rish on the Circuit Review Act of 1970, which created the Circuit 
Review Court. Because the expanded Supreme Court faced 
grave coordination difficulties in divisive constitutional and 
complex statutory cases, it often issued decisions containing a 
dozen or more opinions, most of which were joined by no more 
than a single justice. With respect to matters of constitutional 
interpretation, that was bad enough, but the Court's simultane-
ous insistence upon detailed statutory language, rather than 
broad agency delegations, for most regulatory matters created 
major administrative problems. 
By the late 1960s, political support had grown for the crea-
tion of another court, which would sit between the federal circuit 
courts and the Supreme Court to resolve questions of statutory 
interpretation. The concept was fairly simple. The Circuit Re-
view Court would be obligated to take cases that produced splits 
among the federal circuit courts or among state courts of last re-
sort on nonconstitutional questions of federal law. Such deci-
sions would be binding unless the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and resolved the dispute with a single decision commanding 
no less than simple majority support. To promote cohesion and 
to avoid some of the pitfalls facing the Supreme Court, the Cir-
cuit Review Court has only seven members. 
The effect of the new court was not surprising. The Circuit 
Review Court has become extremely powerful, as you will dis-
cover when you study such courses as Administrative Law, Anti-
trust, Environmental Law, and Securities Law, all of which focus 
on particular aspects of that court's specialized jurisdiction. The 
Circuit Review Act has also had unintended consequences. Be-
cause that court has mandatory, rather than discretionary, juris-
diction, the Attorney General can effectively invoke that court's 
jurisdiction to resolve difficult statutory questions by forcing 
necessary circuit splits. Some commentators have noted rather 
cynically that while the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well, 
it has not prevented the greatest delegation of all, namely con-
gressional delegation to the Circuit Review Court to complete its 
task of legislative drafting. At the same time, the Circuit Review 
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Act has effectively limited the force of the Supreme Court to 
constitutional questions. But since that Court has proved unable 
to resolve many difficult constitutional questions, including those 
involving the powers of Congress and matters of race, the effect 
has often been to transform once-constitutional questions into 
quasi-statutory ones. As a result, commentators have observed 
that since the New Deal, our system has increasingly resembled 
civilian jurisdictions in favoring congressional power over fed-
eral judicial power, even with respect to protecting minorities 
and fundamental rights. Commentators have further noted that 
since the Circuit Review Court was established, our system has 
more closely resembled civilian regimes, including most notably 
France and Germany, in another respect, namely in effectively 
splitting constitutional and nonconstitutional courts. In light of 
this, do you consider it surprising that Circuit Review Court Jus-
tice Marshall Stevens declined a "promotion" to the Supreme 
Court? Finally, as you are no doubt aware, for the past few 
years, efforts to expand the jurisdiction of the Circuit Review 
Court to include certain constitutional issues, or to create a par-
allel review court for that purpose, has gained increasing sup-
port. 
At this time, I would be happy to take some questions .... 
